IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA IN AND FOR PASCO COUNTY CASE NO. 2014CF5586CFAXWS

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

ADAM MATOS,

Defendant: :

PROCEEDINGS: JURY TRIAL

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANDSEL

Circuit Judge

DATE: November 16, 2017

PLACE TAKEN: Pasco County Government Center

7530 Little Road

New Port Richey, FL 34654

REPORTED BY: Maria A. Fortner, RPR

Notary Public

State of Florida at Large

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 1 THE COURT: All right. We can go ahead and 2 3 have the defendant brought in whenever he's ready. Is my jurors here? 5 MR. LAWHORNE: Judge, Mr. Sarabia and 6 Mr. LaBruzzo will be down very soon. There was an 7 issue with the jury instructions. Whatever it was, 8 they fixed. I don't know what it was. And they 9 are reprinting copies right this minutes. 10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 MR. LAWHORNE: And they said it would be less 12 than ten minutes. 13 THE COURT: That's fine. Well, when we get 14 the copies, I want both sides to look at them real 15 quick before we bring the jury up. 16 Did they say whether they're here or not? 17 THE CLERK: I just emailed. They have not 18 actually said. 19 THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. 20 THE CLERK: Yes. They're all here. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 (Recess Taken.) 23 (Defendant Present.) 24 THE COURT: You may be seated. 25 All right. We're back on the record. State

1 of Florida versus Adam Matos. State, you've provided to the Defense a copy 2 3 of the jury instructions that we intend to give the jurors? Yes? 5 MR. LABRUZZO: Yes, Judge. 6 THE COURT: Defense, have you had an 7 opportunity to look them over? 8 MR. VIZCARRA: They've handed them to us, 9 Judge. We are checking them right now. I'm almost 10 done. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. LABRUZZO: Judge, I gave your bailiff 15 13 copies, and a copy for the Court and a copy for the 14 court reporter. 15 THE COURT: Okay. When we release the jurors 16 to start to deliberate, we have two alternates. 17 Are we asking them to be on standby for a penalty 18 phase? 19 MR. LABRUZZO: No, Judge. We're not asking. 20 Having not participated in deliberations, I 21 don't --22 MR. SARABIA: We defer to the Defense on that. 23 MR. LABRUZZO: Judge, I don't really know what 24 the downside would be of releasing them. I'm not 25 really sure -- or keeping them. Forgive me.

1 THE COURT: I'm going to release them. 2 just asking them whether they'll be on standby if 3 we need them. MR. LABRUZZO: Okay. 5 MS. GARRETT: We're not asking for that, Your 6 Honor. 7 THE COURT: Okay. So once they're released, 8 I'll be giving them their certificate and then 9 they'll be released. And I'll let them know that 10 they can stay in here and wait for the verdict or 11 they can go home or whatever they wish to do, as 12 long they don't speak to the jurors. MR. VIZCARRA: Judge, we've reviewed the 13 14 instructions provided to us. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Any objection? 16 MR. VIZCARRA: Judge, I want to renew our 17 objections to the jury instructions. I think I 18 said yesterday, I said something like it was okay, 19 and I don't want that to be construed wrongly. 20 Based on the Court's ruling, the instructions 21 are drafted to reflect those rulings adequately, 22 but our objections are renewed as to all the jury 23 instructions and proposed jury instructions that we 24 had previously made and proposed. 25 THE COURT: Okay. So I had ruled that there

1 were some jury instructions that you were I denied those. So that is still 2 requesting. 3 contemporaneous. But as to the ones -- these are the standard 5 instructions. I think you all objected to me 6 reading the Special Instruction P that the State 7 requested. So I'm going to read it, but your 8 objection is still noted. And I think other than 9 that, we're good to go. 10 All right. Why don't we go ahead and bring 11 the jury up. 12 THE BAILIFF: Yes, Judge. 13 THE COURT: If you want to go ahead and put 14 their jury instructions on their chairs. 15 And we went over, just for the record, last 16 night after we ended, we went over the verdict 17 forms. 18 State, my understanding is you agreed to the 19 verdict forms that you saw last night? 20 MR. SARABIA: Yes, Judge. 21 THE COURT: Defense, yes, verdict form? 22 MR. VIZCARRA: Yes. 23 So I have them. We printed THE COURT: Okay. 24 them after you both had agreed to them. They don't 25 say "draft" on them anymore. I only have one

1 verdict form. You all do not have a copy because 2 the only one I make is the one that goes to the 3 jury. While we have a moment, on the record, 5 Mr. Matos, you were able to look over the jury 6 instructions with your lawyers, correct? 7 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 8 THE COURT: All right. And the verdict form, 9 I also saw you looked over that last night too, 10 correct? 11 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 12 THE COURT: And you're happy with how 13 everything has gone and the strategy that your 14 attorneys have provided for you? 15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Okay. So the only thing left is 17 I'll read the instructions to the jury and then 18 they'll begin to deliberate. 19 All right. Both sides ready? 20 MR. LABRUZZO: Yes, Judge. 21 THE COURT: All right. Bring the jury in. 22 (Jury Present.) The jury is entering the 23 THE BAILIFF: 24 courtroom, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: Thank you.

THE BAILIFF: The jury is all present and 1 2 seated, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Thank you, Bailiff. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. How are 5 you? 6 THE JURY PANEL: Good morning. 7 THE COURT: Was everybody able to follow my 8 instructions last night? 9 THE JURY PANEL: Yes. 10 THE COURT: No watching TV? No reading the 11 newspaper? No talking about the case? 12 THE JURY PANEL: No. 13 THE COURT: All right. So everyone followed 14 my instructions. 15 In front of you today is one additional piece 16 of paper that you didn't have when you left 17 yesterday, and that's that packet that I explained 18 that I would be giving to you. It is the final 19 instructions in this matter. 20 Can we go ahead and lock the courtroom, 21 please. 22 THE BAILIFF: Yes, Judge. 23 THE COURT: Once the courtroom is locked, I'm 24 going to go ahead and move along with reading the 25 final instructions.

As I indicated to you yesterday, I know that you could read them to yourself; however, the law requires that I read each and every word to you. So I just ask if you could follow along while I read them to you and don't read ahead.

Again, those are your copies. You will take those back with you in the jury room. So if there's anything that catches your eye or you want to circle or highlight, feel free to do it.

They're yours and you'll have them in the jury room.

All right. The courtroom now being secure,

I'll move forward with the final instructions.

Members of the jury, I thank you for your attention during the trial. Please pay attention to the instructions I'm about to give you.

Adam Matos, the defendant in this case, has been accused of the crimes of murder in the first degree on Count I; murder in the first degree, Count II; murder in the first degree, Count III; and murder in the first degree, Count IV.

In this case Adam Matos is accused of four counts of murder in the first degree. Murder in the first degree includes the lesser crimes of murder in the second degree and manslaughter, both

1 of which are unlawful.

A killing that is excusable or was committed by the use of justifiable deadly force is lawful. If you find Nicholas Leonard, Megan Brown, Gregory Brown or Margaret Brown were killed by Adam Matos, you will then consider the circumstances surrounding each individual killing in deciding if each individual killing was murder in the first degree, or was murder in the second degree, manslaughter, or whether the killings were excusable or resulted from justifiable use of deadly force in each case.

Justifiable homicide. The killing of a human being is justifiable homicide and lawful if necessarily done while resisting an attempt to murder or commit a felony upon the defendant or to commit a felony in any dwelling house in which the defendant was at the time of the killing.

Excusable homicide. The killing of a human being is excusable and, therefore, lawful under any one of the following three circumstances:

Number 1. When the killing is committed by accident and misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, with usual ordinary caution and without any unlawful intent; or, number two, when

the killing occurs by accident and misfortune in the heat of passion upon any sudden and sufficient provocation; or when the killing is committed by accident and misfortune resulting from a sudden combat if a dangerous weapon is not used and the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner.

Dangerous weapon is any weapon that taken into account the manner in which it is used is likely the produce death or great bodily harm.

I now instruct you on the circumstances that must be proved before Adam Matos may be found guilty of any murder in the first degree or any lesser included crime.

Count I, murder in the first degree. To prove the crime of murder in the first degree, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

- Number 1. Nicholas Leonard is dead.
- Number 2. The death was caused by the criminal act of Adam Matos.
- Number 3. There was a premeditated killing of Nicholas Leonard.

An act includes a series of related actions arising from and performed pursuant to a single design or purpose.

Killing with premeditation is killing after consciously deciding to do so. The decision must be present in the mind at the time of the killing. The law does not fix the exact period of time that must pass between the formation of the premeditated intent to kill and the actual killing. The period of time must be long enough to allow reflection by the defendant. The premeditated intent to kill must be formed before the killing.

The question of premeditation is a question of fact to be determined by you from the evidence. It will be sufficient proof of premeditation if the circumstances of the killing and the conduct of the accused convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of premeditation at the time of the killing.

If a person has a premeditated design to kill one person and in attempting to kill that person actually kills another person, the killing is premeditated.

An issue in this case is whether Adam Matos did not act with a premeditated design to kill because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation. In order to find that the defendant did not act with a premeditated design to

kill because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation:

There must be a sudden event that would have suspended the exercise of judgment in any ordinary reasonable person; a reasonable person would have lost normal self-control and would have been driven by a blind and unreasonable [sic] fury; and there was not a reasonable amount of time for a reasonable person to cool off; and a reasonable person would not have cooled off before committing the act that caused death; and Adam Matos was, in fact, so provoked and did not cool off before he committed the act that caused the death of Nicholas Leonard.

If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant acted with a premeditated design to kill because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation, you should not find him guilty of murder in the first degree.

To prove the crime of first-degree premeditated murder in Count II, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

- Number 1. Megan Brown is dead.
- Number 2. The death was caused by the

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criminal act of Adam Matos.

Number 3. There was a premeditated killing of Megan Brown.

An act includes a series of related actions arising from and performed pursuant to a single design or purpose.

Killing with premeditation is killing after consciously deciding to do so. The decision must be presented in the mind at the time of the killing. The law does not fix the exact period of time that must pass between the formation of the premeditated intent to kill and the killing. period of time must be long enough to allow reflection by the defendant. The premeditated intent to kill must be formed before the killing.

The question of premeditation is a question of fact to be determined by you from the evidence. will be sufficient proof of premeditation if the circumstances of the killing and the conduct of the accused convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of premeditation at the time of the killing.

If a person has a premeditated design to kill one person and in attempting to kill that person actually kills another person, the killing is

1 premeditated.

An issue in this case is whether Adam Matos did not act with a premeditated design to kill because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation. In order to find that the defendant did not act with a premeditated design because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation:

(a). There must have been a sudden event that would have suspended the exercise of judgment in an ordinary reasonable person; and a reasonable person would have lost normal self-control and would have been driven by a blind and unreasonable fury; and there was not a reasonable amount of time for a reasonable person to cool off; and a reasonable person would not have cooled off before committing the act that caused death; and Adam Matos was, in fact, so provoked and did not cool off before he committed the act that caused the death of Megan Brown.

If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant acted with a premeditated design to kill because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation, you should not find him guilty of murder in the first degree.

Possession of a firearm and discharge causing death. If you find that Adam Matos committed murder in the first degree and you also find beyond a reasonable doubt that during the commission of the crime, he personally carried, displayed, used, threatened to use, or attempted to use a firearm, you should find him guilty of murder in the first degree with a firearm.

If you find that Adam Matos committed murder in the first degree but you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he personally carried, displayed, used, threatened to use, or attempted to use a firearm, then you should find him guilty only of murder in the first degree.

If you find that Adam Matos committed murder in the first degree and you also find beyond a reasonable doubt that during the commission of the crime, he possessed and discharged a firearm, and in doing so, caused the death of Megan Brown, you should find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree with possession and discharge of a firearm causing death.

A firearm is legally defined as any weapon, including a starter gun, which will is designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a projectile

by the actions of an explosive; the frame or receiver of any such weapon; any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; any destructive device; or any machine gun.

To actually possess a firearm means that the defendant carried a firearm on his person or had a firearm within immediate physical reach with ready access with the intent to use the firearm during the commission of the crime.

To prove the crime of first-degree murder, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

Greg Brown is dead.

The death was caused by the criminal act of Adam Matos.

Number 3. There was a premeditated killing of Gregory Brown.

An act includes a series of related actions arising from and performed pursuant to a single design or purpose.

Killing with premeditation is killing after consciously deciding to do so. The decision must be present in the mind at the time of the killing. The law does not fix the exact period of time that must pass between the formation of the premeditated

intent to kill and the killing. The period of time must be long enough to allow reflection by the defendant. The premeditated intent to kill must be formed before the killing.

The question of premeditation is a question of fact that must be determined by you from the evidence. It will be sufficient proof of premeditation if the circumstances of the killing and the conduct of the accused convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of premeditation at the time of the killing.

If a person has a premeditated design to kill one person and in attempting to kill that person actually kills another person, the killing is premeditated.

An issue in this case is whether Adam Matos did not act with a premeditated design to kill because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation. In order to find that the defendant did not act with a premeditated design to kill because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation, there must have been a sudden event that would have suspended the exercise of judgment in an ordinary reasonable person; and a reasonable person would have lost normal

self-control and would have been driven by a blind and unreasonable fury; and there was not a reasonable amount of time for a reasonable person to cool off; and a reasonable person would not have cooled off before committing the act that caused the death; and Adam Matos was, in fact, so provoked and did not cool off before he committed the act that caused the death of Gregory Brown.

If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant acted with a premeditated design to kill because he acted in the heat of passion based on an adequate provocation, you should not find him guilty of murder in the first degree.

If you find that Adam Matos committed murder in the first degree and you also find beyond a reasonable doubt that during the commission of the crime he personally carried, displayed, used, threatened to use, or attempted to use a firearm, you should find him guilty of murder in the first degree with a firearm.

If you find that Adam Matos committed murder in the first degree but you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he personally carried, displayed, used, threatened to use, or attempted to use a firearm, then you should find

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him quilty only of murder in the first degree.

If you find that Adam Maton committed many

If you find that Adam Matos committed murder in the first degree and you also find beyond a reasonable doubt that during the commission of the crime, he possessed and discharged a firearm, and in doing so, caused the death of Gregory Brown, you should find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree with possession and discharge of a firearm causing death.

A firearm is legally defined as any weapon, including a starter gun, which will is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the actions of an explosive; the frame or receiver of any such weapon; any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; any destructive device; or any machine gun.

To actually possess a firearm means that the defendant carried a firearm on his person, or had a firearm within immediate physical reach with ready access with the intent to use the firearm during the commission of the crime.

Count four. To prove the crime of first-degree premeditated murder, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

Margaret Brown is dead.

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Adam Matos.

There was a premeditated killing of Margaret Brown.

The death was caused by the criminal act of

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An act includes a series of related actions arising from and performed pursuant to a single design or purpose.

Killing with premeditation is killing after consciously deciding to do so. The decision must be present in the mind at the time of the killing. The law does not fix the exact period of time that must pass between the formation of the premeditated intent to kill and the killing. The period of time must be long enough to allow reflection by the defendant. The premeditated intent to kill must be formed before the killing.

The question of premeditation is a question of fact to be determined by you from the evidence. will be sufficient proof of premeditation if the circumstances of the killing and the conduct of the accused convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of premeditation at the time of the killing.

If a person has a premeditated design to kill

one person and in attempting to kill that person actually kills another person, the killing is premeditated.

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An issue in this case is whether Adam Matos did not act with a premeditated design to kill because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation. In order to find that the defendant did not act with a premeditated design to kill because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation, there must have been a sudden event that would have suspended the exercise of judgment in an ordinary reasonable person; and the reasonable person would have lost normal self-control and would have been driven by a blind and unreasonable fury; and there was not a reasonable amount of time for a reasonable person to cool off; and a reasonable person would not have cooled off before committing the act that caused death; and Adam Matos was, in fact, so provoked and did not cool off before he committed the act that caused the death of Margaret Brown.

If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant acted with a premeditated design to kill because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation, you should not find him

quilty of murder in the first degree.

It is a defense to the crime of murder in the first degree if the actions of Adam Matos

constitutes the justifiable use of deadly force.

Deadly force means force likely to cause death or great bodily harm.

The use of deadly force is justifiable if the defendant reasonably believed that the force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself while resisting, one, another's attempt to murder him, or an attempt to commit felony battery upon him or in any dwelling occupied by him.

A person commits felony battery if he or she actually and intentionally touched or struck a person against the will of another person; and caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement.

Adam Matos was justified in using deadly force if he reasonably believed that such force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself. If Adam Matos was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity and was in a place he had a right to be, then he had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand his ground.

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In deciding whether Adam Matos was justified in the use of deadly force, you must consider the circumstances by which he was surrounded at the time the force was used. The danger need not have been actual; however, to justify the use of deadly force, the appearance of danger must have been so real that a reasonably cautious and prudent person under the same circumstances would have believed that the danger could be avoided only through the use of that force. Based upon appearances, Adam Matos must have actually believed that the danger However, the defendant had no duty to was real. retreat if he was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity and was in a place where he had a right to be.

Adam Matos is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm to himself when using defensive force that was intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another if the person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered; and Adam Matos knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or

had occurred.

The presumption of reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm does not apply if the person against whom the defensive force is used has the right to be in or is a lawful resident of the dwelling, such as an owner, lessee, or titleholder, and there is not an injunction for protection from domestic violence or a written pretrial supervision order of no contact against that person; or the person who uses defensive force is engaged in a criminal activity or is using the dwelling to further a criminal activity.

A person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter another's dwelling is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence.

Dwelling means a building or an conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent or mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, including a tent, and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night.

However, the use of deadly force is not justified if you find that Adam Matos used force to initially provoke the use of force against himself,

unless the force or threat of force asserted towards the defendant was so great that he reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and had exhausted every reasonable means to escape the danger, other than using deadly force on the victim.

In good faith, Adam Matos withdrew from physical contact with the victim and clearly indicated to the victim that he wanted to withdraw and stop the use of deadly force, but the victim continued or resumed the use of deadly force.

In considering the issue of self-defense, you may take into account the relative physical abilities and capacities of the defendant and the victims.

If in your consideration of the issue of self-defense you have a reasonable doubt on the question of whether the defendant was justified in the use of deadly force, you should find the defendant not guilty.

However, if from the evidence you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant was not justified in the use of deadly force, you should find him guilty if all the elements of the charge have been proved.

Mental illness, an abnormal mental condition, or diminished mental capacity is not a defense to any crime in this case. Any such evidence may not be taken into consideration to show that the defendant lacked the specific intent or did not have the state of mind essential to proving that he committed the crimes charged or any lesser included crimes.

In considering the evidence, you should consider the possibility that although the evidence may not convince you that the defendant committed the main crimes of which he is accused, there may be evidence that he committed other acts that would constitute a lesser included crime. Therefore, if you decide that the main accusation has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you will next need to decide if the defendant is guilty of any lesser included crimes. The lesser included crimes indicated in the definition of murder in the first degree are:

Count I: Murder in the second degree and manslaughter.

Count II: Murder in the second degree and manslaughter.

Count III: Murder in the second degree and

manslaughter.

And Count IV: Murder in the second degree and manslaughter.

To prove the crime of murder in the second degree, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

Nicholas Leonard is dead.

The death was caused by the criminal act of Adam Matos.

Number 3. There was an unlawful killing of Nicholas Leonard by an act imminently dangerous to another and demonstrating a deprived [sic] mind without regard to human life.

An act includes a series of related actions arising from and performed pursuant to a single design or purpose.

An act is imminently dangerous to another and demonstrating a deprived mind if it is an act or series of acts that a person of ordinary judgment would know is reasonably certain to kill or do serious bodily injury to another; and is done from ill will, hatred, spite, or an evil intent; and number three, is of such a nature that the act itself indicates an indifference of human life.

In order the convict of murder in the second

degree, it is not necessary for the State to prove the defendant had an intent to cause death.

An issue in this case is whether Adam Matos did not have a deprived mind without regard to human life because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation.

In order to find the defendant did not have a deprived mind without regard to human life because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation, there must have been a sudden event that would have suspended the exercise of judgment in an ordinary reasonable person; and a reasonable person would have lost normal self-control and would have been driven by a blind and unreasonable fury; and there was not a reasonable amount of time for a reasonable person to cool off; and a reasonable person would not have cooled off before committing the act that caused the death; and Adam Matos was, in fact, so provoked and did not cool off before he committed the act that caused the death of Nicholas Leonard.

If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant had a deprived mind without regard for human life because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation, you should

not find him guilty of murder in the second degree.

The next lesser included crime is manslaughter as to Count I. To prove the crime of manslaughter, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

Nicholas Leonard is dead, and Adam Matos intentionally committed an act or acts that caused the death of Nicholas Leonard.

The defendant cannot be guilty of manslaughter by committing a merely negligent act or if the killing was either justifiable or excusable homicide, as I have previously instructed you on Page 2 on the introduction to homicide.

Each of us has a duty to act reasonably towards another. If there is a violation of that duty without any conscious intent to harm, that violation is negligence.

In order to convict of manslaughter by an act, it is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had an intent to cause death, only an intent to commit an act that was not merely negligent, justified, or excusable and which caused death.

Lesser included murder in the second degree as to Count II. To prove the crime of murder in the

second degree, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

Megan Brown is dead.

The death was caused by the criminal act of Adam Matos. Number 3. There was an unlawful killing of Megan Brown by an act imminently dangerous to another and demonstrating a deprived mind without regard for human life.

An act includes a series of related actions arising from and performed pursuant to a single design or purpose.

An act is imminently dangerous to another and demonstrating a deprived mind if it is an act or series of acts that:

Number 1. A person of ordinary judgment would know is reasonably certain to kill or do serious bodily injury to another.

Number 2. Is done from ill will, hatred, spite, or an evil intent.

And number 3. Is of such a nature that the act itself indicates an indifference to human life.

In order to convict of murder in the second degree, it is not necessary for the State to prove the defendant had an intent to cause death.

An issue in this case is whether Adam Matos

did not have a deprived mind without regard for human life because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation.

In order the find that the defendant did not have a deprived mind without regard for human life because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation, there must have been a sudden event that would have suspended the exercise of judgment in an ordinary reasonable person; and a reasonable person would have lost normal self-control and would have been driven by a blind and unreasonable fury; and there was not a reasonable amount of time for a reasonable person to cool off; and a reasonable person would not have cooled off before committing the act that caused the death; and Adam Matos was, in fact, so provoked and did not cool off before he committed the act that caused the death of Megan Brown.

If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant had a deprived mind without regard to human life because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation, you should not find him guilty of murder in the second degree.

If you find that Adam Matos committed murder in the second degree and you also find beyond a

reasonable doubt that during the commission of the crime he personally carried, displayed, used, threatened to use, attempted to use -- excuse me, attempted to use a firearm, you should find him guilty of murder in the second degree with a firearm.

If you find that Adam Matos committed murder in the second degree but you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he personally carried, displayed, used, threatened to use, attempted to use a firearm, then you should find him guilty only of murder in the second degree.

If you find that Adam Matos committed murder in the second degree and you also find beyond a reasonable doubt that during the commission of the crime, he possessed and discharged a firearm, and in doing so, caused the death of Megan Brown, you should find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree with possession and discharge of a firearm causing death.

A firearm is legally defined as any weapon, including a starter gun, which will is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the actions of an explosive; the frame or receiver of any such weapon; any firearm muffler or

firearm silencer; any destructive device or any machine gun.

To actually possess a firearm means that the defendant carried a firearm on his person or had a firearm within immediate physical reach with ready access with the intent to use the firearm during the commission of the crime.

The lesser included, Count II, manslaughter.

To prove the crime of manslaughter, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

Megan Brown is dead, and Adam Matos intentionally committed an act or acts that caused the death of Megan Brown.

The defendant cannot be guilty of manslaughter by committing merely a negligent act or if the killing was either justifiable or excusable homicide, as I have previously instructed you on Page 2 of the introduction to homicide.

Each of us has a duty to act reasonable towards others. If there is a violation of that duty, without any conscious intent to harm, that violation is negligence.

In order to convict of manslaughter by act, it is not necessary for the State to prove that the

defendant had an intent to cause death, only an intent to commit an act that was not merely negligent, justified, or excusable and which caused death.

If you find that Adam Matos committed
manslaughter and you also find beyond a reasonable
doubt that during the commission of the crime, he
personally carried, displayed, used, threatened to
use, or attempted to use a firearm, you should find
him guilty of manslaughter with a firearm.

A firearm is legally defined as any weapon, including a starter gun, which will is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by actions of an explosive; the frame or receiver of any such weapon; any firearm muffler, firearm silencer; any destructive device or any machine gun.

If you find that Adam Matos committed
manslaughter but you are not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that he personally carried,
displayed, used, threatened to use, or attempted to
use a firearm, you should find him guilty only of
manslaughter.

To prove the crime of murder in the second degree as to Count III, the State must prove the

following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

Gregory Brown is dead.

The death was caused by the criminal act of Adam Matos.

Number 3. There was an unlawful killing of Gregory Brown by an act imminently dangerous to another and demonstrating a deprived mind without regard for human life.

An act includes a series of related actions arising from and performed pursuant to a single design or purpose.

An act is imminently dangerous to another and demonstrating a deprived mind if it is an act or series of acts that a person of ordinary judgment would know is reasonably certain to kill or do serious bodily injury to another; and it is done from ill will, hatred, spite, or an evil intent; and is such of a nature that the act itself indicates an indifference to human life.

In order to convict of murder in the second degree, it is not necessary for the State to prove the defendant had an intent the cause death.

An issue in this case is whether Adam Matos did not have a deprived mind without regard to human life because he acted in the heat of passion

based on adequate provocation. In order to find that the defendant did not have a deprived mind without regard for human life because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation, there must have been a sudden event that would have suspended the exercise of judgment in an ordinary reasonable person; and a reasonable person would have lost normal self-control and would have been driven by a blind and unreasonable fury; there was not a reasonable amount of time for a reasonable person to cool off; and a reasonable person would not have cooled off before committing the act that caused the death; and Adam Matos was, in fact, so provoked and did not cool off before he committed the act that caused the death of Gregory Brown. If you have a reasonable doubt about whether

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If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant had a deprived mind without regard for human life because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation, you should not find him guilty of murder in the second degree.

If you find that Adam Matos committed murder in the second degree and you also find beyond a reasonable doubt that during the commission of the crime, he personally carried, displayed, used, threatened to use, or attempted to use a firearm,

you should find him guilty of murder in the second degree with a firearm.

If you find that Adam Matos committed murder in the second degree but you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he personally carried, displayed, used, threatened to use or attempted to use a firearm, then you should find him guilty only of murder in the second degree.

If you find that Adam Matos committed murder in the second degree and you also find beyond a reasonable doubt that during the commission of the crime, he possessed and discharged a firearm, and in doing so, caused the death of Gregory Brown, you should find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree with possession and discharge of a firearm causing death.

A firearm is legally defined as any weapon, including a starter gun, which will is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the actions of an explosive; the frame or receiver of any such weapon; any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; any destructive device; or any machine gun.

To actually possess a firearm means that the defendant carried a firearm on his person or had a

firearm within immediate physical reach with ready
access with the intent to use the firearm during
the commission of the crime.

The lesser included of Count III,
manslaughter. To prove the crime of manslaughter,
the State must prove the following two elements
beyond a reasonable doubt:

Gregory Brown is dead.

Adam Matos intentionally committed an act or acts that caused the death of Gregory Brown.

The defendant cannot be guilty of manslaughter by committing merely a negligent act or if the killing was either justifiable or excusable homicide, as I have previously instructed you on Page 2, introduction to homicide.

Each of us has a duty to act reasonably towards others. If there is a violation of that duty without any conscious intent to harm, that violation is negligence.

In order to convict of manslaughter by act, it is not necessary for the State to prove the defendant had an intent to cause death, only an intent to commit an act that was not merely negligent, justifiable, or excusable and which caused death.

If you find that Adam Matos committed
manslaughter and you also find beyond a reasonable
doubt that during the commission of the crime he
personally carried, displayed, used, threatened to
use, or attempted to use a firearm, you should find
him quilty of manslaughter with a firearm.

A firearm is legally defined as any weapon, including a starter gun, which will is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by actions of an explosive; the frame or receiver of any such weapon; any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; any destructive device; or any machine gun.

If you find that Adam Matos committed
manslaughter but you are not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that he personally carried,
displayed, used, threatened to use, or attempted to
use a firearm, then you should find him guilty only
of manslaughter.

This is the lesser included crime,
second-degree murder, Count IV. To prove the crime
of murder in the second degree, the State must
prove the following three elements beyond a
reasonable doubt:

Margaret Brown is dead.

The death was caused by the criminal act of Adam Matos.

There was an unlawful killing of Margaret

Brown by an act imminently dangerous to another and
demonstrating deprived mind without regard for
human life.

An act includes a series of related actions arising from and performed pursuant to a single design or purpose.

An act is imminently dangerous to another and demonstrating a deprived mind if it is an act or series of acts that a person of ordinary judgment would know is reasonably certain to kill or do serious bodily injury to another, and is done from ill will, hatred, spite, or an evil intent, and is of such a nature that the act itself indicates an indifference to human life.

In order to convict of murder in the second degree, it is not necessary for the State to prove the defendant had an intent to cause death.

An issue in this case is whether Adam Matos did not have a deprived mind without regard for human life because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation.

In order to find that the defendant did not

have a deprived mind without regard for human life because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation, there must have been a sudden event that would have suspended the exercise of judgment in an ordinary reasonable person; and a reasonable person would have lost normal self-control and would have been driven by a blind and unreasonable fury; and there was not a reasonable amount of time for a reasonable person to cool off; and a reasonable person would not have cooled off before committing the act that caused the death; and Adam Matos was, in fact, so provoked and did not cool off before he committed the act that caused the death of Margaret Brown.

If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant had a deprived mind without regard for human life because he acted in the heat of passion based on adequate provocation, you should not find him guilty of murder in the second degree.

The lesser included crime of manslaughter,

Count IV. To prove the crime of manslaughter, the

State must prove the following two elements beyond

a reasonable doubt:

Margaret Brown is dead.

Adam Matos intentionally committed an act or

acts that caused the death of Margaret Brown.

The defendant cannot be guilty of manslaughter by committing a merely negligent act or if the killing was either justifiable or excusable homicide, as I have previously instructed you on Page 2, introduction to homicide.

Each of us has a duty to act reasonable towards others. If there is a violation of that duty, without any conscious intent to harm, that violation is negligence.

In order to convict of manslaughter by act, it is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had an intent to cause death, only an intent to commit an act that was not merely negligent, justified, or excusable and which caused death.

The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. This means you must presume or believe the defendant is innocent. The presumption stays with the defendant as to each material allegation in the Indictment through each stage of the trial, unless it has been overcome by the evidence to the exclusion of and beyond a reasonable doubt.

To overcome the defendant's presumption of innocence, the State has the burden of proving the

crime with which the defendant is charged was committed and the defendant is the person who committed the crime.

The defendant is not required to present evidence or prove anything. Whenever the words "reasonable doubt" are used, you must consider the following:

A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt, a speculative, imaginary or forced doubt. Such a doubt must not influence you to return a verdict of not guilty if you have an abiding conviction of guilt. On the other hand, if, after carefully considering, comparing and weighing all the evidence, there is not an abiding conviction of guilt, or, if, having a conviction, it is one which is not stable but one which wavers and vacillates, then the charge is not proved beyond every reasonable doubt and you must find the defendant not guilty because the doubt is reasonable.

It is to the evidence introduced in this trial and to it alone that you are to look for that proof.

A reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant may arise from the evidence, conflict in the evidence, or the lack of evidence.

If you have a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty. If you have no reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty.

It is up to you to decide what evidence is reliable. You should use your common sense in deciding which is the best evidence and which evidence should not be relied upon in considering your verdict. You may find some of the evidence not reliable or less reliable than other evidence.

You should consider how the witness acted, as well as what they said. Some things you should consider are:

Number 1. Did the witness seem to have an opportunity to see and know the things about which the witness testified?

Number 2. Did the witness seem to have an accurate memory?

Number 3. Was the witness honest and straightforward in answering the attorneys' questions?

Number 4. Did the witness have some interest in how the case should be decided?

Number 5. Does the witness's testimony agree with the other testimony and other evidence in the

case?

Number 6. Has the witness been offered or received any money, preferred treatment or other benefit in order to get the witness to testify?

Number 7. Has any pressure or threats been used against the witness that affected the truth of the witness's testimony?

Number 8. Did the witness at some other time make a statement that is inconsistent with the testimony he or she gave in court?

Number 9. Has the witness been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving dishonesty or false statement?

Number 10. Does the witness have a general reputation for dishonesty or truthfulness?

Whether the State has met its burden of proof does not depend on the number of witnesses it has called or upon the number of exhibits it has offered, but instead upon the nature and quality of the evidence presented.

The fact that a witness is employed in law enforcement does not mean that his or her testimony deserves more or less consideration than that of any other witness.

Expert witnesses are like other witnesses,

with one exception, the law permits an expert
witness to give his or her opinion. However, an
expert's opinion is reliable only when given on a
subject about which you believe him or her to be an
expert. Like other witnesses, you may believe or
disbelieve all or any part of an expert's
testimony.

The defendant in this case has become a witness. You should apply the same rules to the consideration of his testimony that you apply to the testimony of all the other witnesses.

It is entirely proper for a lawyer to talk to a witness about what the witness — excuse me. It is entirely proper for a lawyer to talk to a witness about what testimony the witness would give if called to the courtroom. The witness should not be discredited by talking to a lawyer about his or her testimony.

You may rely upon your own conclusion about the credibility of any witness. A juror may believe or disbelieve all or any part of the evidence or the testimony of any witness.

A statement claimed to have been made by the defendant outside of court has been placed before you. Such a statement should always be considered

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with caution and be weighed with great care to make certain it was freely and voluntarily made.

Therefore, you must determine from the evidence that the defendant's alleged statement was knowingly, voluntarily, and freely made.

In making this determination, you should consider the total circumstances, including but not limited to whether when the defendant made the statement, he had been threatened in order to get him to make it, and whether anyone had promised him anything in order to get him to make it.

If you conclude the defendant's out of court statement was not freely and voluntarily made, you should disregard it.

You've heard testimony of eyewitness identification. In deciding how much weight to give this testimony, you may consider the various factors mentioned in these instructions concerning credibility of witnesses.

In addition to those factors, in evaluating eyewitness identification testimony, you may also consider the capacity and opportunity of the eyewitness to observe the offender based upon the length of time for observation and the conditions at the time of observation, including lighting and

1 distance. Number 2. Whether the identification was the 2 3 product of the eyewitness's own recollection or was the result of some influence or suggestiveness. Number 3. The circumstances under which the 5 6 defendant was present -- excuse me. Was presented 7 to the eyewitness for identification. Number 4. Any inconsistent identification by 8 9 the eyewitness. 10 Any instances in which the eyewitness did 11 not make an identification when given the 12 opportunity to do so. 13 Number 6. The witness's familiarity with the 14 subject identified. 15 Number 7. The lapse of time between the event 16 and the identification. 17 Number 8. Whether the eyewitness and the 18 offender are of different races or ethnic groups 19 and whether this may have affected the accuracy of 20 the identification. 21 And Number 9. The totality of circumstances 22 surrounding the eyewitness's identification. 23 These are some general rules that apply to 24 your discussions. You must follow these rules in 25 order to return a lawful verdict.

You must follow the law as it is set out in these instructions. If you fail to follow the law, your verdict will be a miscarriage of justice.

There is no reason for failing to follow the law in this case. All of us are depending upon you to make a wise and legal decision in this matter.

This case must be decided only upon the evidence that you have heard from the testimony of the witnesses and have seen in the form of exhibits in evidence and these instructions.

This case must not be decided for or against anyone because you feel sorry for anyone, or are angry at anyone.

Remember, the lawyers are not on trial. Your feelings about them should not influence your decision in this case.

Your duty is to determine if the defendant has been proven guilty or not in accordance with the law.

Whatever verdict you render must be unanimous, that is, each juror must agree to the same verdict.

Your verdict should not be influenced by feelings of prejudice, bias or sympathy. Your verdict must be based on the evidence and the law contained in these instructions.

Deciding a verdict is exclusively your job. I cannot participate in that decision in any way, and please disregard anything I may have said or done that make you think I prefer one verdict over another.

You may find the defendant guilty as charged in the Indictment or guilty of any lesser included crimes as the evidence may justify or not guilty.

If you return a verdict of guilty, it must be for the highest offense which has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If you find that no offense has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then, of course, your verdict must be not guilty.

The verdict must be unanimous, that is, all of you must agree to the same verdict. Only one verdict may be returned as to each crime charged. The verdict must be in writing and for your convenience the necessary verdict forms have been prepared for you. And they are as follows:

They are not attached because there's only one. So it's right here. There's four of them.

So it's very easy to figure out which goes to which because it says verdict, and then up at the top it says, murder in the first degree, Count I, Nicholas Leonard. And then, of course, Count II, Count III.

So it's very easy when you're back there, and you have one in your hand to know which verdict form we're talking about.

So this one is to Count I. It says, we the jury finds as follows, check one and only one on this form by inserting a single check mark on the line next to the description of the verdicts which you have found.

Number 1. The defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree as to Nicholas Leonard as charged in the Indictment.

Number 2. The defendant is guilty of the lesser included crimes of murder in the second degree as to Nicholas Leonard.

Number 3. The defendant is guilty of the lesser included charge of manslaughter as to Nicholas Leonard.

And Number 4. The defendant is not guilty.

Sign it. I need the signature of the foreperson. They need to print their name and put their seat number. Because when the verdicts are read, the clerk will read the verdicts, and only read the seat number.

The law requires that the foreperson sign and date the verdict forms in all cases. But when we

read them we do not read their name, we read their seat number. So as to Count I, Nicholas Leonard, that's the verdict form.

As to Count IV, Margaret Brown. Same verdict form, exactly the same way, except it says Margaret Brown on hers. Okay. So I and IV are exactly the same.

Count II is of Megan Brown. Now, you'll see that II and III have the firearm notations in there that I read to you in the instructions. Those only go for II and III.

So on this one it says, we the jury find, check one and only one. In this one the one and only one would be I, II, III or IV. If you check I, II or III, there may be additional check marks that are necessary. So here it says, the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree as to Megan Brown, as charged in the Indictment.

Then below that it says, if and only if you find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree as to Megan Brown, you must further find.

So you only go below I if you check one. If you go to II, then we go below there. So it says, the defendant did possess, display, use, threatened or used or attempted to use a firearm, "yes" or

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"no".

And then there's a second what we call interrogatories, meaning additional questions. And then at (b), if and only if you find guilty of first degree, the defendant — and on this one it's check all that apply.

So the first one is yes, no; and then the second one is check all that applies. So under (b) here, whether it's under I or II, you may have multiple check marks. So just read the instructions. It's very clear on the verdict forms. All right?

It says, the defendant did actually possess a firearm; the defendant did discharge a firearm; the defendant discharge a firearm causing the death or great bodily harm of Megan Brown. So on this one you check all that apply.

Or you don't find for one, you find second-degree murder, the defendant is guilty of the lesser of second-degree murder, same interrogatories under second-degree murder.

Manslaughter here, number three, there's only one interrogatory. And then, of course, not guilty has no interrogatories. All right?

And that's the same for Megan Brown and

Gregory Brown. They're the same. So II and III are the same, and I and IV are the same.

Single defendant, multiple counts. This is very important. A separate crime is charged in each count of the Indictment and, although they have been tried together, each crime and the evidence applicable to it must be considered separately and a separate verdict returned as to each. A finding of guilty or not guilty as to one crime must not affect your verdict as to the other crimes charged.

In just a few moments you will be taken to the verdict form by my bailiff. The first thing you should do is choose a foreperson who will preside over your deliberations. The foreperson should see to it that your discussions are carried on in an organized way and that everyone has a fair chance to be heard. It is also the foreperson's job to sign and date the verdict form when all of you have agreed on a verdict and to bring the verdict form back to the courtroom when you return.

During deliberations, jurors must communicate about the case only with one another and only when all jurors are present in the jury room. You are not to communicate with any person outside the jury

about the case. Until you have reached a verdict, you must not talk about this case in person or through the telephone, writing, or electronic communication, such as a blog, twitter, email, text messages, or any other means. Do not contact anyone to assist you during deliberations. These communication rules apply until I discharge you at the end of the case. If you become aware of any violation of these instructions or any other instructions I have given you in this case, you must tell me by giving a note to the bailiff.

Many of you have cell phones, tablets, laptops, or electronic devices here in the courtroom. The rules do not allow you to bring those phones or any of those types of electronic devices into the jury room. They will be left here, the devices on your seat — well, we have them in the box. They will be guarded by the bailiff while you are deliberating.

If you need to communicate with me, send a note through the bailiff, signed by the foreperson. If you have voted, do not disclose the actual vote in the note.

If you have questions, I will talk with the attorneys before I answer, so it may take some

time. You may continue your deliberations while you wait for my answer. I will answer any questions, if I can, in writing or orally here in open court.

I will tell you that in a hundred percent of the time I will not send a note back. I will have you come out. We'll make sure that it's on the record, and that I have the question correctly, and then I'll answer it here and then I'll send you back. It doesn't take but a few minutes to do that, and that way I make sure I read the question correctly and I'm giving you the correct answer.

Okay? And sometimes I can't give you an answer but you'll know that because I'll tell you I can't answer that.

During the trial, items were received into evidence as exhibits. You may examine whatever exhibits you think will help you in your deliberations. These exhibits will be sent into the jury room with you when you begin to deliberate.

As I indicated earlier, I believe we have guns and bullets, but I can't remember. I'm not going to send the two of them in together. Okay? So if I send in one, I'll let you know the other one is

out here, we'll just switch. Just knock on the door, my bailiff can take the firearms back and give you the ammunition, but we don't let the two go into the jury room together.

And we do have quite a few videos in this matter. I will make sure you have a laptop, my laptop, that you can access the videos on. So you don't have to come back out here and have them played on — we might send the big TV. No, I'm just kidding. We'll just have you have a laptop.

If you need the big TV, let us know and maybe we can send that back too, but I think just the laptop will do. But I will send my personal laptop back in there, that way you can play whatever video. You know, one can be looking at the videos while looking at others.

Also, I believe that some of these items have been in water and whatnot. We will send gloves back. Okay. So you'll have gloves back there to look at all evidence and those matters.

In closing, let me remind you that it is important that you follow the law spelled out in these instructions in deciding your verdict. There are no other laws that apply in this case. Even if you do not like the laws that must be applied, you

1 must use them. For two centuries we have lived by 2 the constitution and the law. No juror has the 3 right to violate the rules we all share. 4 If I can have the lawyers at the bench. 5 (Bench Conference.) 6 THE COURT: Give me a second. Judge Bulone 7 says they send the alternates home and tell them that I might need them. So that's what I'm going 8 9 to do. I'm pretty sure that is what I do. 10 Any objection to the way I read the 11 instructions or did I leave any instructions out? 12 MR. VIZCARRA: Judge, I'd ask you to instruct 13 the jury words to the effect that rely on the 14 written instructions if they differ from what I 15 read. 16 THE COURT: Did I miss a word? 17 MR. VIZCARRA: "Unreasonable" and "unreasoning 18 fury," it's a different meaning and it was 19 important. 20 MR. SARABIA: We agree. 21 THE COURT: Was it typed wrong? 22 MR. LABRUZZO: No, you just --23 THE COURT: Did I just keep mispronounce wrong 24 over and over? 25 MR. LABRUZZO: Yes. You also said deprived

1 instead of depraved. Not a big thing. MR. SARABIA: Mr. Lawhorne noted that as well. 2 3 So if you guys want her to just mention that to the jury. 5 MR. VISCARRA: Because it was typed properly. 6 So if it's different, then just rely on the written 7 word, or whatever you think is appropriate, Judge. 8 THE COURT: I'll take care of it. Anything 9 else? 10 MR. VIZCARRA: No. 11 MR. SARABIA: 12 (Open Court.) 13 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, 14 I've been told my pronunciation of certain words 15 was bad. Okay? So please rely on the written 16 instructions that you all have copies to make sure. 17 If it's different than the way I pronounced 18 it, please use the written instructions. I've read 19 for like 45 pages. I think I mispronounced a 20 couple of words. Sorry about that. But each of 21 you have written instructions, so make sure that 22 you rely on your written instructions. 23 Jurors Number 13, 14, and 15, that will be 24 that top three back on the back wall, you are 25 alternate jurors. That means since everybody made

it through all the weeks, that at this time you can be excused. You you are not needed for deliberations at this time. However, I need you to provide a phone number where you can be reached. There may be a situation where we need to call you back.

I would ask that you not talk about the case with anyone or each other until you're released from that. We'll call you as soon as the deliberations are over and I can release you at that time. But right now I cannot release you from talking about it, discussing it, you can't look at the newspaper, because if anything happens to any of the jurors, we could restart deliberations from the beginning with an alternate. Okay?

So right now I'm going to release you with the same instructions, don't talk about it, no reading, no texting, no tweeting. I will give you a certificate of appreciation. You can leave your notes right there. And at this time you're free to go. Okay? You don't have to remain here. If you wish to remain here, that's fine. But you're free to go at this time.

We have your electronic devices here, and we'll go ahead and release you with your electronic

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devices. Do you all have anything in the back in the jury room? No? All right. Then you can step out at this time. Thank you all so much.

All right. For the rest of you, it's time for you to go ahead and grab your notes, your jury instructions, and I'm going to ask you to step into the jury room and begin your deliberations.

My bailiff will be back there in a few minutes with all the evidence. We have 642 pieces of evidence. So it's going to take him a few minutes to put it all together. He'll have the verdict forms for you. And if you need anything, we'll have you knock on the door for us. Okay? And then we'll figure it out.

(Jury Absent.)

THE COURT: All right. We'll be in recess until the jury returns a verdict.

MR. LABRUZZO: Judge, if I may, just real quick. You mentioned your laptop. I believe all the videos will play on the laptop the Court provides, but it may require some instruction that they have to open up a player or an application in the file to then actually play it. So if that's becomes an issue.

THE COURT: Will you leave the videos out

1	here. I'll make sure how they play before I send
2	them in. Okay.
3	MR. LABRUZZO: Thank you, Judge.
4	THE COURT: All right. Anything else?
5	MR. VISCARRA: Judge, there's a proffer
6	whenever the Court feels that should be done. I
7	know we're pretty close to the jury room.
8	THE COURT: That's fine. I told him he could
9	proffer some things once the jury went out.
10	Do you need Mr. Matos on the stand?
11	MR. VIZCARRA: Please, Judge.
12	THE COURT: All right. If we can have
13	Mr. Matos brought onto the stand.
14	THE COURT REPORTER: I do that on the record?
15	THE COURT: It's a proffer. I'm leaving.
16	They're going to ask the questions, he's going to
17	answer them. So I'll be back. You can go ahead
18	with the proffer while I go get my laptop.
19	(The Court Absent.)
20	PROFFER EXAMINATION
21	BY MR. VISCARRA:
22	Q. Mr. Matos, what was that day, August 28th,
23	2014, like for you?
24	A. It was the worse day of my life. It was just
25	a horrible experience. It was like a nightmare, a

1	nightmare that I couldn't wake up from.
2	Q. Regarding staying there and taking care of
3	your son tell us how difficult it was for you
4	to mentally stay in the house.
5	A. It was difficult in many ways. The horrible
6	memories that occurred there. Just reliving the
7	experience over and over every day. It was very
8	emotional.
9	Q. But you continued to stay there?
10	A. Yes.
11	Q. Regarding leaving at home alone, why
12	would you do that?
13	A. The state of mind that I was in, I was not
14	thinking clearly. I feel horrible for doing so. In a
15	normal situation, I wouldn't have done that. And as a
16	child, I was left home from time to time, and maybe that
17	had something to do with why I acted that way, but at
18	the time I wasn't thinking clearly.
19	Q. Was that how you were raised?
20	A. Yes.
21	Q. Mr. Matos, let's go back to how you met Megan
22	Brown and found out that you were father.
23	Okay. How long were you guys together?
24	A. On and off through the years.
25	Q. Where was it that you guys met?

- 1 A. In Emmaus, Pennsylvania.
 - Q. Can you tell me the circumstances about that?
 - A. We met through a mutual friend in Emmaus,

 Pennsylvania. We were -- I was 19, I believe she was 18

 at the time. And she came over to my house one day with

 a mutual friend and that's how I met her.
 - Q. How long were you together before you found out she was pregnant with a child?
 - A. A few months.
 - Q. Did you have court-ordered visitation in Pennsylvania?
 - A. Yes.

- Q. What was Megan's attitude about staying or going?
- A. She wasn't sure. Her parents were trying to convince her to go. I wanted to stay. I tried convincing her to stay. It was the town that we spent most of our lives. was born there. He had friends there. He was going to school. There was beautiful parks that we would go to and spend time with him. And he loved it there. It was a great place to raise our child.
- Q. And did you, in fact, try to convince her to stay in Pennsylvania?
 - A. Yes. I tried convincing her many times to

1 stay.

- Q. But she decided to go to Florida anyway?
- A. Yes.
- Q. I was asking you about your discussion with Nick Leonard. What did he say to you when you talked to him on the phone?
- A. When I talked to Nicholas Leonard, he was upset about an incident that occurred when he was at the bar with Megan. Apparently she was flirting with a bartender and he became jealous and upset and he left the bar.
 - Q. You said he was jealous and upset. Go ahead.
- A. He was jealous and upset when he left the bar and he called me. First he texted me and then we talked on the phone. He called me as he was entering the cab. And as we were talking, he was just letting me know that him and Megan had an altercation at the bar, and he was upset that she was flirting with the bartender and that his opinion of her was that she was a whore and that he didn't want her anymore and that he was done with her completely.
- MR. VISCARRA: That's all I have. Thank you.

 THE DEFENDANT: You're welcome. Thank you.

24 (The Court is present.)

MR. SARABIA: Judge, I don't get to ask some

questions about the questions he proffered? 1 THE COURT: What? 2 3 MR. SARABIA: The defendant, I don't get to 4 cross him on the answers he gave on the proffer? 5 THE COURT: No. Because I didn't even let the 6 questions come in. 7 MR. SARABIA: Okay. THE COURT: So if it was improper, then it was 8 9 improper. 10 (Recess Taken.) 11 They're here, Judge. MR. LABRUZZO: 12 THE COURT: No problem. But I need the 13 lawyers. 14 All right. Ladies and gentlemen, I'm about to 15 bring the jury in. I would ask to keep your voices 16 There will be no talking, screaming, 17 carrying on. All right. As soon as the jury comes 18 in, we'll read the verdict, and then move on from 19 there. 20 State, are you ready to proceed? I've been 21 told that the jury has reached their verdict. 22 MR. LABRUZZO: Yes, Judge, we are. 23 Judge, there are just a couple MR. SARABIA: 24 more family members that I think are entering the 25 building. If we can give them a couple of minutes

1	to get up here.
2	THE COURT: Okay. I thought that they were
3	here.
4	MR. SARABIA: Not all of them.
5	THE COURT: Oh, okay. Then I'll give them a
6	few more minutes. I'll bring the jury in at 2:45.
7	MR. SARABIA: Okay.
8	THE COURT: All right.
9	MR. SARABIA: Thank you. All right. Judge,
10	they're all here.
11	THE COURT: All right. I'll wait until they
12	are seated.
13	All right. We're back on the record. State
14	of Florida versus Adam Matos. The jury has reached
15	their verdict. The defendant is present.
16	Any reason not the bring the jury back?
17	Defense?
18	MR. MICHAILOS: No, Your Honor.
19	THE COURT: State?
20	MR. SARABIA: No, Judge.
21	THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bailiff, you can
22	have the jury return.
23	THE BAILIFF: Yes, Your Honor. The jury is
24	now entering the courtroom, Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: Thank you.

1 (Jury Present.) THE BAILIFF: Jurors all present and seated, 2 3 Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 5 Juror Number 10, I understand you are the 6 foreperson; is that correct, sir? 7 JUROR NUMBER 10: Yes, ma'am. THE COURT: And you've reached a verdict? 8 9 JUROR NUMBER 10: Yes, ma'am. 10 THE COURT: Do you have the verdict forms? 11 JUROR NUMBER 10: Yes, ma'am. 12 THE COURT: If you can hand those to my 13 bailiff. Thank you, sir. 14 All right. If the defendant wants to rise, 15 defense attorney, and I will have the clerk publish 16 the verdicts. 17 THE CLERK: In the Circuit Court of the Sixth 18 Judicial Circuit, of the State of Florida, in and 19 for Pasco County. Case Number 2004CF005586AXWS. 20 State of Florida versus Adam Matos. 21 Indictment for Count I, Murder in the First 22 Degree. Verdict. We the jury find as follows: 23 The defendant is guilty of murder in the first 24 degree as to Nicholas Leonard, as charged in the 25 Indictment.

So say we all this 16th day of November, 2017. Signed the foreperson, Juror Number 10.

Indictment for Count II, Murder in the First Degree. We the jury find as follows: The defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree as to Megan Brown, as charged in the Indictment.

We further find the defendant did possess, display, use, threaten to use, or attempt to use a firearm.

We further find the defendant did actually possess a firearm. The defendant did discharge a firearm. The defendant did discharge a firearm causing the death or great bodily injury of Megan Brown.

So say we all this 16th day of November, 2017. Signed the foreperson, Juror Number 10.

Indictment for Count III, Murder in the First Degree. We the jury find as follows: The defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree as to Gregory Brown, as charged in the Indictment.

We further find the defendant did possess, display, use, threaten to use or attempt to use a firearm.

We further find the defendant did actually possess a firearm. The defendant did discharge a

1 firearm. The defendant did discharge a firearm 2 causing the death or great bodily injury of Gregory 3 Brown. So say we all this 16th day of November, 2017. 5 Signed the foreperson, Juror Number 10. 6 Indictment for Count IV, Murder in the First 7 Degree. We the jury find as follows: defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree 8 9 as to Margaret Brown, as charged in the Indictment. 10 So say we all this 16th day of November, 2017. 11 Signed the foreperson, Juror Number 10. 12 THE COURT: All right. Does the Defense wish 13 to have the jury polled? 14 MR. VISCARRA: Please, Judge. 15 THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, 16 we're going to poll the jury. The clerk will call 17 your seat number. And it's a yes or no answer. 18 She's going to ask if the verdicts that she has 19 read are, in fact, your verdicts. If they are, 20 please say, yes. If they aren't, say, no. And 21 she'll do it by seat number. 22 Madam Clerk. 23 THE CLERK: Would you like me to go each count 24 one after the other?

THE COURT: No. We'll just do it as a whole.

25

1	That's fine.
2	THE CLERK: Okay.
3	Juror Number 1, is the verdict rendered your
4	verdict?
5	JUROR NUMBER 1: Yes.
6	THE CLERK: Juror Number 2, is the verdict
7	rendered your verdict?
8	JUROR NUMBER 2: Yes.
9	THE CLERK: Juror Number 3, is the verdict
10	rendered your verdict?
11	JUROR NUMBER 3: Yes.
12	THE CLERK: Juror Number 4, is the verdict
13	rendered your verdict?
14	JUROR NUMBER 4: Yes.
15	THE CLERK: Juror Number 5, is the verdict
16	rendered your verdict?
17	JUROR NUMBER 5: Yes.
18	THE CLERK: Juror Number 6, is the verdict
19	rendered your verdict?
20	JUROR NUMBER 6: Yes.
21	THE CLERK: Juror Number 7, is the verdict
22	rendered your verdict?
23	JUROR NUMBER 7: Yes.
24	THE CLERK: Juror Number 8, is the verdict
25	rendered your verdict?

JUROR NUMBER 8: 1 Yes. THE CLERK: Juror Number 9, is the verdict 2 3 rendered your verdict? JUROR NUMBER 9: Yes. 5 THE CLERK: Juror Number 10, is the verdict 6 rendered your verdict? 7 JUROR NUMBER 10: Yes. THE CLERK: Juror Number 11, is the verdict 8 9 rendered your verdict? 10 JUROR NUMBER 11: Yes. 11 THE CLERK: Juror Number 12, is the verdict 12 rendered your verdict? 13 JUROR NUMBER 12: Yes. 14 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, ladies and 15 gentlemen. 16 At this time, as we discussed when you were 17 originally impaneled, the verdicts in this case 18 were for murder in the first degree, which entails 19 that you as a panel will have to make a decision on 20 the sentence involved in this matter. 21 We are going to begin that on Monday. You'll 22 be released today. You'll have Friday, Saturday 23 and Sunday off. I'm going to have you come back on 24 Monday at 9:30, and we'll begin the second phase,

the sentencing phase in this matter.

25

Again, you will continue not to read, talk, tweet, blog or anything about the case. You are still the jury deciding the second phase of this matter. So although you have made a decision on the guilt of the defendant, the sentence could be affected by you reading something or hearing something or talking to somebody about this.

So at this time I'm going to go ahead -- your notes, your jury instructions we're going to keep. You'll need those for the second phase, so we'll have them right back here. If you want to put them in the envelope, and they'll be right back on your chair when you get back here on Monday at 9:30.

As I told you, I believe that we are a day ahead of when we originally had said that we would go through. Depending on how the testimony goes on Monday, my thought is is that on Tuesday I will do the exact same thing I did today, which is I will bring you back on Tuesday, I will instruct you on Tuesday, and you will begin to deliberate.

So I'll give you more information on Monday before you leave, because I'll know after it goes on Monday how the timing is; but right now my guess is is that you'll be deliberating for that matter on Tuesday.

And so at this time you are released. Keep your jury badge. I'll keep everything else. And we'll see you in the jury pool room at 9:30 on Monday morning. All right?

Again, keep that number with you, if there's any issues. Okay? So at this time, I thank you, and I'll release you for the day.

(Jury Absent.)

THE BAILIFF: The jury is out of the presence of the Court, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. He can be seated. We have a few more things to talk about.

All right. What I'd like is for the individuals who are going to be handling the second phase to be here at 8:30 tomorrow morning. We'll discuss the jury instructions, so we can go over them and make sure that we have any disagreement, at least discussed and reviewed before we begin on Monday. There's a part where I have to read them an instruction about with a they're going to do, and I want to make sure we have all that agreed to.

Defense, how many witnesses do you believe that you'll be calling? I'm not holding you to it.

I mean, just a ballpark figure.

MR. LIVERMORE: We have listed 12, I believe.

I don't think any of them will be that long. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. LIVERMORE: We do have a Skype session scheduled Monday 3:00 to 5:00 --5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 MR. LIVERMORE: -- from up north. 7 assuming the openings aren't that long. 8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MR. LIVERMORE: I believe we can probably get 10 through most of them, if not all of them. 11 THE COURT: Okay. And I have spoken to court technology. 12 They've already talk to me this 13 afternoon, they came in. The State is going to 14 remove big TV, so that they can bring in their 15 equipment and make sure that it's ready when your 16 Skype is ready. 17 MR. LIVERMORE: And I believe they already 18 tested it last week. 19 THE COURT: Right. So they just need the big 20 TV to be gone, and the State has indicated they'll 21 take it with them today. They may even bring it in 22 tomorrow and set it up so we know it's here, 23 double-check again. 24 So, State, do you have any additional 25 witnesses that you'll be presenting in penalty

1 |

phase?

MR. LABRUZZO: Not at this stage of the penalty, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. The only other thing that we'll have to work through, and I'm sure you'll have that for me tomorrow, is what mitigation or mitigators you want me the put in. If you can kind of have an idea.

MR. LIVERMORE: Yes, we do.

THE COURT: I'm sure in your head you've got them kind of worked on, but if you can shore that up, because we want to make sure that we have the jury instructions correct.

But, again, I don't think that part of the jury instructions, the final instructions we'll do until Tuesday, if we can get through everything on Monday.

I mean, the introduction part, the explanation of how we're going to get this done and all that, that doesn't have the mitigators in it. That just says we just talk about them in general terms, but the final instructions we'll have to have those in there, and, of course, anything else you think is mitigation part will be in there.

So is there anything else that the Court needs

to discuss today in reference to what happened for the rest of the last two weeks? Anything? State?

MR. LABRUZZO: Judge, I was just going to ask the Court, the instruction and the aggravator listed by the State is the prior violent felony. In the instruction refers to a conviction, and so based on that -- I know the jury having found their verdict is one thing, but if the Court would adjudicate Mr. Matos as to each count.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LABRUZZO: So that it is a clear record as to our argument as to his conviction, that there's no ambiguity in the fact that he has, in fact, been convicted, we would appreciate that.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. If I can have the defense and Mr. Matos approach the podium.

Mr. Matos, at this time in Case

Number 14CF5586, the jury having returned a verdict
of guilty on Count I, murder in the first degree;
Count II, murder in the first degree; Count III,
murder in the first degree; and Count IV, murder in
the first degree, I now adjudicate you guilty on
all four counts. Sentencing will begin on Monday,
as I just went over. Your lawyers are ready to go
on that.

And you'll be remanded. You had no bond up to now and you'll remain on zero bond on all four counts. And I will adjudicate guilty, and the sentencing part of that will begin on Monday.

Defense, do you have any questions?

MR. MICHAILOS: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So at this time we'll be in recess until tomorrow at 8:30 to discuss the penalty phase instructions, and then Monday we'll begin the actual penalty phase.

Mr. Matos does need to be brought over tomorrow. He does not have to be dressed out if doesn't want to. He can save his suits for next week. There's not going to be any jurors here.

I'm not saying you wouldn't be dressed out. I'm just saying if you don't want to wear a tie and a jacket, you can just wear, you know, some pants and a polo shirt. It's up to you. It's whatever you want. Okay? It completely your decision.

I'm just saying the jurors won't be here.

They're not supposed to be watching anything or seeing anything. So you can discuss that with your lawyers, but you don't — if you want to come in your stuff from the jail, that's fine. If you want to wear something less formal, you can do that too.

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Okay? But it's completely your decision.
 1
 2
              Any other questions?
 3
              MR. VISCARRA: No, Judge.
              THE COURT: All right. We're good to go?
 4
 5
               THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
              THE COURT: All right. We'll be in recess
 6
 7
         until tomorrow morning. Thank you.
     (HEARING CONCLUDED.)
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
STATE OF FLORIDA)
COUNTY OF PASCO)
I, MARIA FORTNER, Registered Professional
Reporter for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, do certify that
I was authorized to and did stenographically report the
foregoing proceedings and that the transcript is a true
record.
DATED this 10th day of April, 2018.
/S MARIA A. FORTNER MARIA A. FORTNER
Registered Professional Reporter

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4	628 (Call log) 629 (Metadata)	1830 1856
4	630 (Photographs)	1837
5	631 (Report)	1824
6	632 (Report) 634 (New Star business record)	1824 1813
	635 (Wells Fargo business record)	1810
7	636 (Google certificate of authenticity)	1801
8	637-640 (Screen captures)	1848
	Volume XIII	
9	633 (Photo pack)	2022
10	641 (Bill from Skinny's)	2019
11	Volume XV	
12	Defense 1 and 2	2281
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